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MAKING BLACK AND BROWN LIVES MATTER: 
INCORPORATING RACE INTO THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CURRICULUM 
CYNTHIA LEE* 
The fatal shooting of Michael Brown, an African American teenager, in 
August 2014 by a White police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, and the death of 
Eric Garner, an African American man who died after being put into a 
chokehold by a New York City police officer in July 2014, led to a firestorm of 
protests under the moniker of “Black Lives Matter.”1 Many Blacks saw these 
two deaths and the failure to indict the officers involved as reflecting a lack of 
concern for Black lives.2 
 
* Cynthia Lee is the Charles Kennedy Poe Research Professor of Law, The George Washington 
University Law School, and the author of MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND 
FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (N.Y. Univ. Press 2003) and CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (3d ed. West 2014) (written with Angela Harris). Many of the articles described in 
this Article will be included in her forthcoming Criminal Procedure casebook, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (West 2016) (written with L. Song Richardson & Tamara 
Lawson). Professor Lee thanks Charles Calleros, César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, and L. 
Song Richardson for their helpful comments on a draft of this paper. She also thanks Matthew 
Halldorson and Mario Kolev from The George Washington University Law School for their 
research assistance, and Joseph Welling, Managing Editor of the Teaching Issue, and the students 
on the Saint Louis University Law Journal for their editorial assistance in the production of this 
Article. 
 1. Jonathan Capehart, From Trayvon Martin to ‘Black Lives Matter’, WASH. POST: POST 
PARTISAN (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2015/02/27/ 
from-trayvon-martin-to-black-lives-matter/ [http://perma.cc/3JRP-MEA2]; Claudia Rankine, ‘The 
Condition of Black Life Is One of Mourning’, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 22, 2015), http://www.ny 
times.com/2015/06/22/magazine/the-condition-of-black-life-is-one-of-mourning.html [http://per 
ma.cc/F3FA-ZT7P] (discussing origins of the Black Lives Matter movement). 
 2. Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is Not 
Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2014, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-dar 
ren-wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html [http://perma.cc/LX5Y-YX85] (describing 
the civil unrest in Ferguson as being based on a perceived “pattern of police brutality against 
young black men”); Adam Chandler, Eric Garner and Michael Brown: Deaths Without 
Indictments, ATLANTIC (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/eric-
garner-grand-jury-no-indictment-nypd/383392/ [http://perma.cc/FZ59-J8SJ] (noting that New 
York Police Department Officer Daniel Pantaleo was not indicted by a New York grand jury for 
the death of Eric Garner); Jonathan Capehart, ‘Black Lives Matter’ to Everyone—Finally, WASH. 
POST: POSTPARTISAN (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/20 
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Blacks and Latinos constitute only thirty percent of the United States 
population but make up fifty-six percent of the inmates in prisons and jails 
across the country.3 The disproportionate numbers of Black and Brown people 
behind bars should be reason alone to pay attention to the role of race in our 
criminal justice system, but the United States Supreme Court and many lower 
courts continue to turn a blind eye to race and the possibility that racial bias—
explicit or implicit—may contribute to the decisions that are made by police, 
prosecutors, and jurors to arrest, charge, and convict.4 Likewise, many criminal 
procedure casebooks present the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure 
jurisprudence as a series of race-neutral decisions. If the law professor who 
teaches Criminal Procedure wants students to think about race, the professor 
often has to supplement the cases in the traditional casebook with other 
materials.5 This Article is aimed at helping the professor who wants to 
 
14/12/05/black-lives-matter-to-everyone-finally/ [http://perma.cc/6NJ3-F99A] (noting that the 
failure to indict in both the Brown and Garner cases reflected a failure of “the accountability that 
our criminal justice system strives for”). In the Ferguson case, an investigation into the shooting 
by the United States Department of Justice found that the physical and forensic evidence 
supported Officer Wilson’s claim of self-defense, and that the officer shot Brown as Brown was 
moving toward the officer. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT 
REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN 
BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON 6–8 (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.jus 
tice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_
michael_brown_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/YV4Q-PKGK]. In the New York case, the City of New 
York agreed to pay $5.9 million to the family of Eric Garner in a pretrial settlement of the civil 
lawsuit the family filed in the wake of Garner’s death. Kevin Conlon & Ray Sanchez, Eric 
Garner’s Family Reacts to $5.9 Million Settlement, CNN (July 14, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2015/07/14/us/garner-nyc-settlement/ [http://perma.cc/9E CA-GGPT]. 
 3. NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, BLACK LIVES MATTER: 
ELIMINATING RACIAL INEQUITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2015). 
 4. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 
977–78 (2002) (critiquing Justice O’Connor’s colorblind approach in Florida v. Bostick); 
Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 963–64 (1999) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s colorblind opinion in Terry 
v. Ohio); Cynthia Lee, (E)Racing Trayvon Martin, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 91, 100–13 (2014) 
(critiquing the decision by the trial judge in the George Zimmerman murder trial to run a 
colorblind trial); see also Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in 
a Not yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1556 (2013) (discussing the importance of 
making race salient if one is concerned about racial bias). Supreme Court Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor, the Supreme Court’s first Latina justice, does pay attention to race. See, e.g., id. at 
1611 (discussing comments by Justice Sotomayor, chastising a prosecutor for his reliance on 
racial stereotypes during his cross-examination of a witness). 
 5. Assigning supplemental material that focuses attention on racial issues can be risky for 
an untenured professor or a professor of color since students may resent having to read materials 
not in the casebook. Some students may think that the professor is pushing his or her own 
progressive agenda on them. If a professor is concerned about such issues, that professor may 
wish to adopt a casebook that already incorporates such materials. One criminal procedure 
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incorporate race into the basic criminal procedure curriculum by providing 
references to specific supplemental materials that the professor can assign to 
her students. 
One who wants to highlight race in the basic criminal procedure class has 
many opportunities to do so. One can start with Mapp v. Ohio, the case in 
which the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule to the states through 
the Due Process Clause.6 Few people know that Dollree Mapp, the woman 
behind this decision, was a strong-willed Black woman whose refusal to 
consent to the search of her home and her insistence that the police show her a 
warrant led to this historic decision.7 Ms. Mapp’s refusal to cede her rights to 
the police led Professor Wayne LaFave to call her the “Rosa Parks of the 
Fourth Amendment.”8 While the fact that Ms. Mapp was a Black woman 
probably had nothing to do with the Court’s decision to apply the exclusionary 
rule to the states, it is noteworthy that a Black woman’s refusal to let police 
search her house without a warrant (just like Rosa Parks’ refusal to cede her 
seat at the front of the bus) was behind arguably one of the most important 
criminal procedure decisions the Supreme Court has ever issued. 
Every criminal procedure professor I know teaches Katz v. United States, 
the seminal Supreme Court case on what constitutes a “search” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.9 In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan 
announced a two-part test for deciding when a search has occurred.10 “My 
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is 
a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”11 Even though it was announced in a 
concurring opinion, the Court has embraced Justice Harlan’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy test as the test for a search.12 
On its face, Katz seems like a case that has nothing to do with race or class. 
Not so, according to the late Professor William Stuntz who pointed out in his 
article, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, that Katz’s focus on 
 
casebook that does this is CYNTHIA LEE, TAMARA LAWSON & L. SONG RICHARDSON, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (West 2016). 
 6. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653, 660 (1961). 
 7. Ken Armstrong, Dollree Mapp, 1923-2014: “The Rosa Parks of the Fourth 
Amendment”, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/ 
08/dollree-mapp-1923-2014-the-rosa-parks-of-the-fourth-amendment [http://perma.cc/ZY9S- 
A7J7]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967). 
 10. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 11. Id. 
 12. E.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177, 188 (1984); United States v. Jones, 132 
S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
484 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:481 
reasonable expectations of privacy benefits the wealthy and disadvantages poor 
people, particularly poor people of color living in the inner city.13 This is 
because most wealthy people live in single-family homes with a lot of space 
between them and their neighbors.14 This enables those with means to keep 
their lives and possessions fairly private. Conversely, poor people tend to live 
with many other people in multi-unit apartment dwellings or public housing 
units with thin walls, where everyone tends to know everyone else’s 
business.15 
Whren v. United States16 offers a mother lode of opportunities to discuss 
race. In Whren, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when 
police officers stop an individual who has committed a traffic violation, even if 
the real reason for the stop is merely a hunch that the individual is involved in 
criminal activity.17 The defendants, who were both Black, argued that if police 
officers are allowed to stop any motorist simply based on probable cause to 
believe the motorist has committed a traffic violation, “police officers might 
decide which motorists to stop based on decidedly impermissible factors, such 
as the race of the car’s occupants.”18 In response to this concern, the Court said 
that any complaint about racial discrimination in being selected by police for a 
stop had to be vetted under the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth 
Amendment.19 
Arguably, Whren gives police officers cover to engage in racial profiling 
or the targeting of individuals based on racial stereotypes linked to criminal 
activity. Since all the officer needs is probable cause to believe the individual 
in question has committed a traffic violation, the officer can pull over an 
individual even if the real reason the officer is doing so is because he thinks, 
based on the individual’s race, that the individual is more likely to have drugs 
or contraband in the car. Many Blacks, including many prominent Blacks, have 
been subjected to racial profiling.20 
 
 13. William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1265, 1272–73 (1999). Similarly, Christopher Slobogin notes that under Supreme Court 
case law, “the homes and belongings of poorer folk receive lesser constitutional protection from 
government searches.” Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 
55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 403 (2003). 
 14. Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1270. 
 15. Id. at 1272. 
 16. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 17. Id. at 819. 
 18. Id. at 810. 
 19. Id. at 813. 
 20. For example, Cornel West, a prominent African American professor of philosophy at 
Princeton University, describes being shunned by numerous taxi drivers when he needed to catch 
a cab in New York City. CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS, at ix-x (1993). In his recently 
published book, Just Mercy, Bryan Stevenson, executive director of the Equal Justice Initiative, a 
professor at New York University Law School, and a well-known capital defense attorney, talks 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] MAKING BLACK AND BROWN LIVES MATTER 485 
To help non-Black students understand the experience of being racially 
profiled, I like to assign Professor Paul Butler’s short Legal Times article, 
‘Walking While Black’: Encounters With the Police on My Street.21 In this 
article, Butler, a prominent criminal law professor at Georgetown Law School, 
describes the experience of being stopped by police officers who thought he 
was a burglary suspect when he was walking home from work one evening.22 
The only thing Butler had in common with the men suspected of burglarizing 
the homes in the well-to-do neighborhood where Butler lived and was stopped 
was that he and they were young, Black, and male. Another article that does an 
excellent job of helping the reader feel what it is like to be racially profiled is 
Professor Devon Carbado’s (E)racing the Fourth Amendment.23 In this article, 
Carbado, a law professor at the University of California at Los Angeles School 
of Law, describes two experiences in which he was racially profiled and 
treated like a criminal suspect, even though he was not guilty of any crime.24 
When I teach Whren, I also like to assign Professor David Harris’ “Driving 
While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses, which does an excellent job of 
critiquing Whren.25 Harris argues that Whren will end up harming Black and 
Brown drivers because it gives police officers the green light to engage in 
racial profiling.26 As long as the officer can point to an observed traffic 
violation, the officer can pull over any driver, even if the real reason for the 
stop is a hunch.27 Harris points out that the most careful driver cannot avoid 
violating some traffic law during a short drive.28 Whren thus gives police the 
authority to pull over all drivers. The more significant problem, however, 
according to Harris, is that police will not pull over all drivers who are 
violating the law. Since they cannot pull over everyone, they will pull over just 
 
about being questioned by a police officer who suspected Stevenson, who at the time was a young 
attorney parked outside his apartment listening to Sly and the Family Stone, was a would-be 
burglar. BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 38–42 
(2014). Patricia Williams, a well-respected law professor at Columbia Law School, tells the story 
of being turned away from a Benetton clothing store because the store clerk thought she was a 
would-be thief. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 45–51 (1991). 
 21. Paul Butler, ‘Walking While Black’: Encounters With the Police on My Street, LEGAL 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 1997, at 23. 
 22. Id. at 23–24. 
 23. Carbado, supra note 4, at 949. 
 24. Id. at 946, 953, 959–61. 
 25. David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme 
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 545 (1997). I also like 
to show students a clip from Professor Harris’ 1997 address on the Whren case before the 
Congressional Black Caucus. African Americans and Police Brutality, C-SPAN (Feb. 16, 2014), 
http://www.c-span.org/video/?c4484601/david-harris [http://perma.cc/3QXA-58FD]. 
 26. Harris, supra note 25, at 560, 563. 
 27. Id. at 558. Ordinarily, a hunch is not sufficient to detain an individual. Id. at 573 n.183. 
 28. Id. at 545. 
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those drivers they think are most likely to be involved in criminal activity, i.e. 
Black and Brown drivers.29 Harris then gives numerous examples of police 
doing just this.30 
If one teaches United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,31 the 1975 case in which 
the Supreme Court held that Mexican appearance standing alone does not 
justify stopping all Mexican Americans to ask if they are aliens,32 one can 
expose the students to some critical race critiques of this decision. At first 
glance, Brignoni-Ponce seems like a good decision. This was the way I 
understood the case when I first read it. After all, the Court found that the stop 
in question violated the Fourth Amendment because Border Patrol agents 
relied exclusively on the apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants in the 
vehicle to justify the stop. The Court, however, also stated in dictum, “The 
likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough 
to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor . . . .”33 
In La Migra in the Mirror: Immigration Enforcement and Racial Profiling 
on the Texas Border, Professor César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández argues 
that the Supreme Court in Brignoni-Ponce in essence endorsed racial profiling 
in the immigration context.34 Hernandez points out that it is quite easy for a 
law enforcement officer to find some reason other than apparent Mexican 
ancestry to justify stopping someone of apparent Mexican ancestry.35 The 
Brignoni-Ponce Court made this task even easier by spelling out reasons other 
than Mexican ancestry that can support a stop based on reasonable suspicion of 
illegal immigration activity. According to the Court, in deciding whether there 
is reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, officers may consider factors such as 
erratic driving, obvious attempts to evade officers, the fact that the vehicle 
appears to be heavily loaded, the fact that the vehicle contains an extraordinary 
number of passengers, and the fact that some passengers are trying to hide.36 
Hernandez then recounts the time when he and his family were in Seattle, 
Washington, celebrating his brother’s graduation from law school. He notes 
that under Brignoni-Ponce, his family could have easily been detained: 
Rereading Justice Powell’s words in Brignoni-Ponce . . . I am reminded of 
how broad these factors reach. Recently, my family and I were in Seattle 
celebrating my brother’s graduation from law school. Ten of us were crammed 
 
 29. Id. at 560. 
 30. Id. at 560–69. 
 31. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
 32. Id. at 875. 
 33. Id. at 887. 
 34. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, La Migra in the Mirror: Immigration 
Enforcement and Racial Profiling on the Texas Border, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 167, 183–84 (2009). 
 35. Id. at 182. 
 36. Id. at 182–83. 
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into a seven-person van, including two of us who were crouched in the rear 
cargo compartment. Many of us were born in México and lived there at least a 
few years of our lives. A few of us currently live directly on the border. Our 
driver, my oldest brother, was unfamiliar with the Seattle neighborhood in 
which we were traveling. After the graduation ceremony, on our way back to 
the large house that we rented for the weekend, he got lost and circled an 
industrial waterfront neighborhood full of warehouses and cargo ports. I can 
only imagine how erratic and heavily loaded our oversized vehicle looked, and 
how “Mexican” its passengers appeared. I can only be grateful that we were 
not near “the border and its functional equivalents” where immigration officers 
have the Supreme Court’s seal of constitutional approval to stop and question 
families like mine—too large, too Mexican, too lost—who are riding in a 
suspicious vehicle, an enormous blue van with sliding doors, fold-down seats, 
spare tires, and out-of-state license plates—to blend into the landscape.37 
Another critique of Brignoni-Ponce that can be shared with students is 
University of California at Davis School of Law Dean Kevin Johnson’s The 
Case Against Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement.38 In this article, 
Johnson focuses our attention on the following passage in Brignoni-Ponce: 
“The likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high 
enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor . . .” to justify a stop to 
ask if the person is an alien.39 Johnson asks us to consider how we would feel 
if the Supreme Court had instead said: “‘[T]he likelihood that any given person 
of [African American] ancestry is [a criminal] is high enough to make [African 
American] appearance a relevant factor’ in a criminal stop.”40 Johnson says 
most of us would be outraged at such a statement, yet the Supreme Court’s 
similar statement in Brignoni-Ponce, regarding Mexican American appearance, 
largely went unnoticed.41 
Johnson notes that in deciding that Mexican appearance was a relevant 
factor because of the high likelihood that any person of Mexican ancestry is an 
alien, i.e. an immigrant, the Supreme Court likely relied on the Government’s 
assertion that eighty-five percent of the undocumented population in this 
country was of Mexican ancestry.42 Johnson points out that this figure is not an 
accurate figure since Mexican nationals actually constitute roughly half of the 
undocumented population, not eighty-five percent of that population.43 More 
 
 37. Id. at 184–85. 
 38. Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 
WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 694 (2000). 
 39. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975). 
 40. Johnson, supra note 38, at 694. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 707. 
 43. Id. at 708. In 2000, the Ninth Circuit held that “Hispanic appearance is, in general, of 
such little probative value that it may not be considered as a relevant factor” for courts to consider 
when deciding whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop an individual. United States 
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importantly, Johnson argues that the Supreme Court should have focused on 
the percentage of Hispanic persons in the United States with lawful 
immigration statuses because these are the people harmed by racial profiling in 
immigration enforcement.44 Johnson points out that the vast majority—
approximately ninety percent—of Hispanics living in the United States are 
lawful permanent residents or United States citizens.45 Finally, Johnson argues 
that allowing Border Patrol agents to rely on “apparent Mexican ancestry” is 
problematic because it “reinforces negative, ill-conceived stereotypes” about 
persons of Mexican ancestry.46 Johnson notes that many of Mexican ancestry 
are actually “blond, blue-eyed and white,” and some even “have red hair and 
hazel eyes.”47 Thus, “[t]he stereotype of the dark-haired, brown skinned (often 
linked to ‘dirty’) ‘Mexican’ ignores the rich diversity of physical appearances 
among Latinos.”48 
Racial profiling affects more than just Black and Brown drivers.49 In 
Profiling Terror, Professor Sharon Davies notes that after the 9/11 attacks on 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a new type of profiling emerged: the 
ethnic profiling of those perceived to be Arab or Muslim.50 Davies notes that in 
contrast to the widespread public condemnation of racial profiling of Blacks 
and Latinos at the time, many Americans endorsed the profiling of Muslims 
and Arabs.51 Davies argues that such profiling is misguided.52 
 
v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000). The court explained that the Hispanic 
population has grown so much since Brignoni-Ponce was decided that the mere fact that one 
looks Hispanic is of little or no use in deciding which Hispanics are undocumented. Id. at 1134. 
The court explained, “Brignoni-Ponce was handed down in 1975, some twenty-five years ago. 
Current demographic data demonstrate that the statistical premises on which its dictum relies are 
no longer applicable. The Hispanic population of this nation, and of the Southwest and Far West 
in particular, has grown enormously—at least five-fold in the four states referred to in the 
Supreme Court’s decision.” Id. at 1133. The court further explained that “[r]easonable suspicion 
requires particularized suspicion, and in an area in which a large number of people share a 
specific characteristic, that characteristic casts too wide a net to play any part in a particularized 
reasonable suspicion determination.” Id. at 1134 (emphasis in original). 
 44. Johnson, supra note 38, at 708. 
 45. Id. at 709. 
 46. Id. at 710, 714. 
 47. Id. at 714–15 (emphasis in original). 
 48. Id. at 715 (internal citation omitted). 
 49. In his excellent book on race and class in the American criminal justice system, No 
Equal Justice, David Cole provides a list of characteristics that federal agents have asserted are a 
part of the “drug courier profile.” DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 47–49 (1999). Many of these characteristics, such as 
“arrived late at night” and “arrived early in the morning” and “one of first to deplane” and “one of 
last to deplane,” contradict one another. Id. at 48. 
 50. Sharon L. Davies, Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45, 48 (2003). 
 51. Id. at 46 n.6. 
 52. Id. at 85. 
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Another type of profiling that occurs is the profiling of transgender 
individuals as sex workers. The term “walking while trans” has been coined to 
reflect the fact that police often assume trans people on the street are 
prostitutes.53 Pooja Gehi, executive director of the National Lawyers Guild, 
discusses this type of profiling in Gendered (In)security: Migration and 
Criminalization in the Security State and points out that poor transgender 
people of color are often profiled in this way.54 
The automobile exception seems like a subject devoid of racial 
implications, but Professor David Sklansky shows how Wyoming v. 
Houghton,55 one of the main cases on the automobile exception, actually 
reinforces racial and class bias. In The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 
Sklansky critiques the Supreme Court’s increasing focus on whether the search 
in question constituted a search at early common law, as exemplified in Justice 
Scalia’s opinion in Wyoming v. Houghton.56 Sklansky notes that this originalist 
focus—Sklansky calls it Scalia’s new Fourth Amendment originalism57—
makes it difficult to address inequities of race and class since eighteenth-
century rules of search and seizure codified class privilege, and did not reflect 
a commitment to equality.58 
Terry v. Ohio59 provides fertile ground for discussing race. A professor can 
expose the students to many critiques of this decision. In Stopping the Usual 
Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, Professor Anthony Thompson 
points out that nowhere in the Supreme Court’s thirty-nine-page opinion does 
the Court mention that Terry and one of his companions were Black, the other 
companion was White, and Officer McFadden was White.60 In the excerpt that 
follows, Thompson then explains why this omission matters: 
  The Court stripped away the racial dimension of the case by removing all 
references to the participants’ race. Although one cannot, of course, 
reconstruct the reasons for this rhetorical choice, it seems evident at least that 
this was a conscious choice. In his suppression hearing testimony, Detective 
 
 53. JOEY L. MOGUL, ANDREA J. RITCHIE & KAY WHITLOCK, QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 61 (2012) (noting that police 
profiling of transgender women of color as sex workers is so pervasive that queer communities 
have coined the phrase “walking while trans” to describe the experience of being targeted because 
of their gender and racial identities). 
 54. Pooja Gehi, Gendered (In)security: Migration and Criminalization in the Security State, 
35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 357, 368–69 (2012). 
 55. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303–04 n.1, 309 (1999). 
 56. David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1739, 1760 (2000). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1772–73. 
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McFadden repeatedly referred to the “third man” (Katz) as a “white man”; the 
lawyers who questioned McFadden did so as well. Yet, the Court's opinion 
refers to him only as “the third man” or by name. 
  The removal of race from the case presented the Court with a dilemma, 
however. To determine whether to uphold McFadden's actions under the new 
“stop and frisk” doctrine, the Court had to ascertain precisely why McFadden 
stopped and frisked Terry. After all, an essential element of pre-Terry 
“probable cause” doctrine—and one the Court carried forward to the new “stop 
and frisk” rule—was that a search and seizure had to be supported by specific 
facts that could be weighed by an objective magistrate. But, with race 
eliminated from the case, the most obvious explanation for McFadden’s 
suspicions and his subsequent actions was unavailable. The Court was left with 
McFadden’s testimony that “he was unable to say precisely what first drew his 
eye to them.” 
  What the Court did to “make sense” of McFadden’s actions is best 
understood in the terms of narrative theory. As others have explained, a sound 
judicial opinion requires coherent factual and legal narratives. Such narratives 
permit the judges to clarify the events in their own minds and to present the 
facts and law in a manner that the legal community will generally accept. In 
Terry, the narrative upon which the Court settled was one of the “police officer 
as expert.”61 
In Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, Professor Lewis Katz 
explains how Terry and its progeny permit police to use the fact that the stop 
took place in a high crime neighborhood as a factor in the reasonable suspicion 
calculus.62 Katz argues that this allows a “high crime area” to serve as a proxy 
for race.63 Another law review article that can be assigned along with Terry v. 
Ohio is Professor L. Song Richardson’s Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth 
Amendment.64 In this article, Richardson explains how implicit bias works, and 
how it can encourage police to stop and frisk Black individuals more often than 
White individuals.65 
When covering Terry stops and frisks, one can also discuss the fairly 
recent lawsuit challenging the New York Police Department’s stop and frisk 
policy. In 2008,66 a group of Blacks and Latinos filed a class action lawsuit 
against the City of New York (“City”), alleging that the New York Police 
 
 61. Id. at 967–69 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 62. Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 493 
(2004). 
 63. Id. 
 64. L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
2035, 2056 (2011). 
 65. Id. at 2038–39. 
 66. Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 1, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 
2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 1034). 
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Department’s stop and frisk policy violated their rights under the Fourth 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.67 
Plaintiffs presented findings from an empirical study by Columbia Law 
Professor Jeffrey Fagan, showing that between January 2004 and June 2012, 
the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) conducted more than 4.4 
million Terry stops.68 Over 80% of these 4.4 million stops were of Blacks or 
Hispanics.69 Despite this massive effort, weapons were seized in only 1.06% of 
the stops of Black individuals and 1.25% of stops of Hispanic individuals; 
contraband was seized in only 1.79% of the stops of Black individuals and 
1.73% of the stops of Hispanic individuals.70 After a bench trial, United States 
District Court Judge Shira A. Scheindlin found that the City, through its police 
department, had adopted a policy of indirect racial profiling, targeting young 
Black and Latino men for stops based on local crime suspect data.71 In a 198-
page opinion, Judge Scheindlin held that the NYPD’s stop and frisk policy 
resulted in the disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of Blacks and 
Hispanics in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the Fourth 
Amendment.72 According to Judge Scheindlin, the NYPD’s policy violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because it subjected all members of a racially defined 
group to heightened police enforcement simply because some members of that 
group are criminals,73 and it violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the 
plaintiffs because the stops lacked individualized reasonable suspicion.74 
 
 67. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 556; Joseph Goldstein, Trial to Start in Class-Action Suit on 
Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2013, at A15, http://www.ny 
times.com/2013/03/18/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-trial-to-open-this-week-in-federal-court.html 
[http://perma.cc/4RPE-GRL4]. 
 68. Second Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 10 tbl.1, Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d 
540 (No. 08 Civ. 1034) [hereinafter Fagan Report]; Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558. 
 69. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559. Even though Blacks constituted 23% and Latinos 
constituted 29% of New York City’s population at the time, 52% of the 4.4 million individuals 
stopped by NYPD officers were Black and 31% were Latinos. Id. Whites, who made up 33% of 
New York City’s population, constituted only 10% of the individuals stopped. Id. 
 70. Fagan Report, supra note 68, at 35 tbl.15. 
 71. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 553, 562. 
 72. Id. at 562. 
 73. Id. at 563. 
 74. Id. at 660. The City appealed Judge Scheindlin’s ruling. On October 31, 2013, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals stayed Judge Scheindlin’s ruling, suggesting that she misapplied 
a local rule regarding transfer of related cases and violated ethics rules by giving media 
interviews responding to criticism of the District Court. Ligon v. City of New York, 538 F. App’x 
101, 102 (2d Cir. 2013). The Second Circuit, however, did not rule on the merits of the appeal. Id. 
at 103. In February 2014, the Second Circuit lifted the stay and remanded the case back to the 
District Court so that the parties could engage in settlement discussions. Ligon v. City of New 
York, 743 F.3d 362, 365 (2d Cir. 2014). In March 2014, the City and the plaintiffs reached an 
agreement on a settlement whereby the City, under then newly-elected Mayor Bill de Blasio, 
would enact reforms, including “training, supervision, monitoring and discipline regarding stop-
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Illinois v. Wardlow, the case in which the Supreme Court held that flight in 
conjunction with a high crime neighborhood gives officers reasonable 
suspicion to stop and frisk individuals, provides another opportunity to discuss 
race. Underlying this decision is an assumption that flight from police suggests 
guilt. In “Black and Blue Encounters”—Some Preliminary Thoughts About 
Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, Professor Tracey Maclin 
critiques Justice Scalia’s suggestion in California v. Hodari D.75 that flight 
from police supports any inference of guilt.76 Maclin explains: 
[In California v. Hodari D.], Justice Scalia intimated that it is reasonable to 
detain young men who “scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police.” 
For Scalia . . . proverbial common sense [indicates that] “The wicked flee 
when no man pursueth.” 
  From a police perspective, Justice Scalia’s remarks may make sense . . . . 
Of course, this viewpoint, never considers that Hodari, a black youth, may 
have had alternative reasons for wanting to avoid the cops. Many persons who 
have never committed a crime have ambivalent or negative attitudes about the 
police. Perhaps, a youth like Hodari flees at the sight of police because he does 
not wish to drop his pants, as many black youths in Boston have been forced to 
do, just because cops suspect he belongs to a gang or is selling drugs. 
  Or maybe Hodari has had an older sibling or friend roughed up by the 
police, and does not wish to undergo a similar experience with the approaching 
officers. Perhaps Hodari has seen the video-tape of the Los Angeles police 
beating and kicking Rodney King, or he has seen the NBC video of Don 
Jackson, a former police officer himself, being pushed through a store window 
by Long Beach, California police officers for no reason. Maybe Hodari 
believed that the officer who wants to ask him “What’s going on here?” may 
engage in similar brutality in his case. As California Assemblyman Curtis 
Tucker was quoted as saying: “When black people in Los Angeles see a police 
car approaching, ‘They don’t know whether justice will be meted out or 
whether judge, jury and executioner is pulling up behind them.’”77 
Similarly, in Fleeing While Black, Amy Ronner argues there was not enough 
information to warrant the Wardlow Court’s conclusion that Wardlow’s flight 
from police in the neighborhood he was in gave police reasonable suspicion to 
stop him.78 Finally, in Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research 
 
and-frisk” policies. Floyd v. City of New York, 302 F.R.D. 69, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In return, 
the City dismissed its appeal on the constitutionality of stop and frisk. Floyd v. City of New York, 
770 F.3d 1051, 1063 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 75. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 
 76. Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—Some Preliminary Thoughts About 
Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 276 (1991). 
 77. Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
 78. Amy D. Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth Amendment Apartheid, 32 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 383, 385, 414 (2001). 
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in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Professors Tracey Meares and Bernard 
Harcourt share the results of a study of street stops in New York City released 
about three weeks before the Wardlow decision that found that for every 
twenty-six stops undertaken because the suspect fled the scene, only one stop 
resulted in an arrest.79 Meares and Harcourt conclude that “[t]his astoundingly 
high [inverse] relationship between stops and arrests is suggestive that in high-
crime urban communities where the population is disproportionately minority, 
flight from an identifiable police officer is a very poor indicator that crime is 
afoot.”80 
Florida v. Bostick81 is another case that is often included in criminal 
procedure casebooks to help students understand what constitutes a “seizure” 
of the person for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Under the traditional test 
for a “seizure” of the person, a person is seized if the reasonable person in her 
shoes would not have felt free to leave.82 Florida v. Bostick established a 
modified test for a “seizure” of the person in cases in which factors not caused 
by law enforcement make it such that the reasonable person would not feel free 
to leave, such as the fact that the bus one is on might depart with all of one’s 
possessions if one were to leave.83 In such cases, a person is “seized” within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if the reasonable person in her shoes 
would not have felt free to decline the officer’s requests or terminate the 
encounter with the police.84 
When teaching Bostick, a criminal procedure professor can assign an 
excerpt from Professor Devon Carbado’s (E)racing the Fourth Amendment.85 
In this article, Carbado provides a critical race critique of Florida v. Bostick. 
Carbado explains how Justice O’Connor’s colorblind opinion in Florida v. 
Bostick ignored the racial reality of a Black man being confronted by a White 
police officer, making it easy to conclude that Bostick—who in all likelihood 
did not feel free to leave or terminate the encounter with the officer—was not 
“seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes.86 
 
 79. Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and 
Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
733, 790 (2000). 
 80. Id. at 792. 
 81. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
 82. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
 83. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435–36. 
 84. Id. at 437. 
 85. Carbado, supra note 4. 
 86. Id. at 976. To see how Carbado’s critique is relevant even today, see Lee, (E)Racing 
Trayvon Martin, supra note 4 (using Carbado’s critique of Justice O’Connor’s colorblind opinion 
in Florida v. Bostick as a springboard for critiquing the colorblind handling of the trial of George 
Zimmerman, the neighborhood watch captain charged with murdering Trayvon Martin). If one 
teaches INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984), one can assign a different part of Carbado’s article 
where Carbado critiques INS v. Delgado. Carbado, supra note 4, at 990–99. 
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In introducing the subject of police interrogations to the students, a 
professor might encourage students to think about how racial stereotypes and 
implicit bias might influence the interaction between the police officer and the 
suspect. In Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, 
the late Professor Andrew Taslitz relies on social science to explain why a 
police officer may think a Black suspect is lying when it is possible that the 
individual is simply being defensive and hostile.87 
If one teaches the Edwards rule88—the rule that once a suspect in custody 
asks for an attorney, all questioning must cease until an attorney is present—
one knows that under Davis v. United States89 the suspect must clearly and 
unambiguously request an attorney in order to trigger the Edwards rule.90 To 
get students to think critically about Davis’ clear request rule, the professor can 
assign an excerpt from Professor Janet Ainsworth’s In a Different Register: 
The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation.91 In this article, 
Ainsworth shows how legal rules requiring the use of direct language can 
adversely affect women and some ethnic minorities who “habitually adopt a 
speech register including indirect and qualified modes of expression very much 
like those observed in typical female language use.”92 
CONCLUSION 
This Article provides just a sampling of materials that can be used to 
incorporate the subject of race into the basic criminal procedure curriculum. 
Many other resources exist from which one can draw to incorporate not only 
race but also gender, class, sexual orientation, and gender identity into the 
curriculum. 
If one is wondering why one should incorporate issues of race into the law 
school classroom, there are several good reasons to do so. Professor Cheryl 
Wade, who teaches Corporations, suggests “it is important to discuss race 
whenever relevant because [our] students will practice law in a society in 
which racism is ubiquitous but not always apparent and recognizable.”93 Wade 
 
 87. Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, 4 
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 90. Id. at 459. 
 91. Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police 
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goes on to note that “[i]gnoring issues of race in the law school’s core courses 
and relegating such issues to Law and Race and Critical Race Theory 
seminars” marginalizes discussions of race.94 The result is that “[o]nly the 
students who enroll in ‘race courses’ have available opportunities to discuss 
race and racism.”95 Additionally, as Dean Kevin Johnson of the University of 
California at Davis School of Law suggests, “[i]ntegrating race into class 
discussion broadens the students’ focus beyond the doctrine outlined in the 
case at hand (without diminishing its importance),” and raises students’ 
awareness of how seemingly race-neutral law implicates social justice 
concerns.96 Professor Charles Calleros observes that incorporating issues of 
race into the classroom is an excellent vehicle for developing critical thinking 
skills because students usually care deeply about such issues and can challenge 
one another to analyze the issues from a variety of perspectives.97 
Some might be opposed to efforts to incorporate race into the law school 
curriculum on the ground that doing so sends a message that White lives do not 
matter or that they do not matter as much as Black and Brown lives. Such 
concerns are similar to those that have animated the debate over the Black 
Lives Matter movement. In the past several weeks, “Black Lives Matter” signs 
in Bethesda, Maryland, and Washington, D.C., have been vandalized, blocking 
or cutting out the word “Black” from these signs.98 The hashtag “#AllLives 
Matter” has become a popular response to the Black Lives Matter movement.99 
Aware of popular sentiment against the Black Lives Matter movement, some 
presidential candidates have edited their campaign speeches, deleting the word 
“Black” from the “Lives Matter” slogan.100 
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Petula Dvorak, a columnist for the Washington Post, explains why the “All 
Lives Matter” or “Lives Matter” labels are problematic: 
  It’s like defacing “Support Our Troops” stickers to read “Support Our 
People” and wondering why military families would be offended. 
  Of course, we want to support all people, and, of course, all lives matter. 
But deliberately cutting out “Troops” or “Black” announces that the struggles 
and challenges of those populations are not distinct from those of everyone 
else.101 
Dvorak continues: 
  Every day, much of America declares—in ways overt and subtle—that 
only some lives matter. 
  A job applicant named John gets a callback. Jamal doesn’t. 
  A sidewalk in a predominantly white neighborhood gets meticulously 
maintained. The sidewalk in the mostly black neighborhood in the same city is 
crumbling. 
  . . . . 
  [The #BlackLivesMatter movement] is not arguing that Gay Lives don’t 
matter, or Hispanic Lives don’t matter or All Other Lives don’t matter. 
  It is a reminder that a boy armed with nothing more than Skittles and a 
soda should not be shot dead because of that deep, insidious racism that 
America wants to pretend doesn’t exist. 
  So when someone went to the River Road Unitarian Universalist 
Congregation in Bethesda last week and knifed the word “Black” out of the 
vinyl sign the church had hung on its lawn, it was a hostile act denying all the 
hard work we Americans still have ahead of us.102 
If one makes a conscious effort to incorporate race into the criminal procedure 
curriculum, this does not mean that one thinks White lives do not matter. One 
is merely recognizing the significant role that race plays in our criminal justice 
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